When Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and Narendra Modi meet under the banner of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, cameras flock to the big three. But the SCO’s future will likely be decided elsewhere: in the steppes and cities of Central Asia. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan now shape Eurasia’s energy security, mineral chains, and digital standards—often by splitting buyers across rival blocs and forcing both East and West to compete on their terms.

Kazakhstan: uranium diplomacy and the art of splitting buyers

In 2023, state-owned Kazatomprom exported $2.1 billion of uranium. Nearly 48% went to China (via CGN and CNNC). The rest powered reactors in Europe and North America through France’s Orano, Canada’s Cameco—co-owner of the Inkai mine—and trading routes through Switzerland and the Netherlands. Proven reserves stand near 1.2 million tonnes U₃O₈, the largest globally.

Kazakhstan’s oil: Chevron, Exxon—and Europe’s lifeline

Kazakhstan exported about 70 million tons of crude in 2023 (~1.4 mb/d): roughly 20% to China, 35% to the EU (Italy, Netherlands, France, Spain), and the remainder to Turkey, Switzerland, and Asian buyers. National reserves are near 30 billion barrels. Operators include Chevron and ExxonMobil (Tengiz), Eni and TotalEnergies (Kashagan), alongside CNPC and Lukoil.

Turkmenistan: China’s bargain gas lifeline

Turkmenistan piped 42 bcm of gas to China in 2023, earning $10+ billion. China’s CNPC buys at relatively low contract prices and resells domestically at higher rates—capturing significant arbitrage. Turkmenistan’s proven reserves approach 13.6 tcm (4th largest worldwide). If Ashgabat develops westbound routes, Beijing’s cheap pipeline advantage narrows.

Uzbekistan: the gold vault of Eurasia

Uzbekistan exported $6.5 billion in gold in 2022—mostly to Switzerland for refining. Reserves are estimated at ~2,100 tonnes, among the global top ten and larger than South Africa’s. The Muruntau open-pit mine alone yields ~60 tonnes per year, anchoring Tashkent’s financial autonomy.

Kyrgyzstan & Tajikistan: small states, strategic minerals

Kyrgyzstan’s Kumtor mine produces 14–17 tonnes of gold annually—over a tenth of GDP. Tajikistan refines roughly 450,000 tonnes of aluminum a year, feeding aviation and electronics supply chains. Both also sit atop underexplored lithium and rare earth prospects.

Lithium, nickel, and rare earths

Uzbekistan holds an estimated ~1.2 million tonnes of lithium reserves (potential global top ten). Kazakhstan has nickel and cobalt deposits, underdeveloped compared to Indonesia’s dominance. Jakarta’s export bans and periodic unrest have lifted global prices—making Central Asian diversification more attractive to battery supply chains.

Digital futures under authoritarian hands

Uzbekistan has roughly doubled internet penetration in a decade (~75%). Kazakhstan sits near ~91% and aims to be a fintech hub by 2030. Both court Huawei’s Digital Silk Road, Indian digital public infrastructure models, and Western cloud/cybersecurity—an illiberal-modernizer paradox that gives them outsized leverage over standards and vendors.

Security without submission

Kazakhstan deepens NATO peacekeeping cooperation; Uzbekistan expands Turkish defense ties (Bayraktar drones, training); Kyrgyzstan oscillates between Russia’s CSTO and regional alternatives. SCO membership coexists with diversified security hedging—no single patron gets a monopoly.

The money question: dollars vs yuan

Despite de-dollarization rhetoric, most regional trade still settles in USD and euros. Yuan use is growing but remains secondary. Energy and metals contracts default to hard-currency norms—pragmatism beats ideology across the steppes.

SCO, BRICS+, and the Global South architecture

Overlapping memberships link SCO security dialogues with BRICS+ financial experiments (New Development Bank, alt-payments). Together they cover over 40% of the world’s population and roughly a third of global GDP (PPP), yet contradictions remain: Saudi Arabia still anchors the petrodollar; India resists Chinese dominance; Central Asia keeps options open.

Western weakness, Eurasian rise

Europe’s energy re-wiring elevated Kazakhstan’s crude and uranium; France leans on Kazakh fuel for its nuclear fleet. The U.S. remains entangled via Cameco–Kazatomprom ventures. As Western politics drift and fiscal strain bites, Eurasian resources become more indispensable—and Central Asia’s leverage grows.

“Uranium is Kazakhstan’s ace card; neither East nor West can run their reactors without it.”

The real center of gravity

Kazakhstan splits uranium between rivals. Turkmenistan sells cheap gas to China while flirting with Europe. Uzbekistan finances itself with gold. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan hedge with minerals. All balance, all profit. The SCO’s credibility will be decided in the steppes—not in the Kremlin or Zhongnanhai.